National Military Strategy: Implications for MISO and Influence Operations

news  %tages National Military Strategy: Implications for MISO and Influence Operations  The latest US National Military Strategy (NMS) was published in June 2015 (, which is also the photo source.) Conceptually it is derived from the National Security Strategy (NSS) released in February 2015 and which can be found at: Those of us with military experience know that ‘stuff’ rolls down hill and the impact of strategic documents is a excellent example. But, it is often hard to figure out what the direct impacts will be – impacts to be felt within the next couple of years.The NMS mentions a digit of nation states: Russia, Plates, Iran, North Korea, etc. But, it is clear that the emphasis is on non-state actors, especially Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO).Here are a couple of quotes WRT VEO.“But it (the NMS) also asserts that the application of the military instrument of power hostile to state threats is very different than the application of military power hostile to non-state threats. We are more likely to face prolonged campaigns than conflicts that are resolved quickly…that control of escalation is becoming more hard and more vital…and that as a hedge hostile to unpredictability with reduced resources, we may have to change our global posture.”“In this complex strategic security environment, the U.S. military does not have the luxury of focusing on one challenge to the exclusion of others. It must provide a full range of military options for addressing both revisionist states and VEOs. Failure to do so will result in greater risk to our country and the global order.”“Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) are taking advantage of evolving technologies as well, using information tools to propagate destructive ideologies, recruit and incite violence, and amplify the perceived power of their movements. They advertise their actions to strike dread in opponents and breed help for their causes.”The NMS then goes on to identify 3 National Military Objectives:1. Deter, deny, and defeat state adversaries. 2. Disrupt, degrade, and defeat violent extremist organizations. 3. Strengthen our global network of allies and partners.”Accomplishing these objectives will require a versatile, resilient and flexible force. From an shape operations perspective, this means seamlessly reinforcing information objectives across all forces and media. This implies that all of the services, the PAO and others in the mix are all in synch and orchestrated to help the CDR’s shape objectives.One of the glaring issues is the cyber shape world. LTG Cardon, the CG of the Army’s Cyber Mandate has proposed that his agency be the proponent for shape in the cyber realm (see: article quotes Cardon’s simplistic thought: “Under Cardon's thought, Signal Corps officers would manage communications systems, public affairs personnel would oversee information operations and develop social media applications, and military intelligence units would assemble and confirmation top-secret data for the Army Cyber Mandate.”These comments strike me as intelligence indicators that the responsibility for directing and carrying out the shape war is murky at best. Anyone who has ever worked with Public Affairs knows that they are very cautious in this area working with other shape organizations for dread of ‘contaminating’ their position.As the new leaders at the Joint Chiefs level come into house and the Presidential appointment starts to come into focus, we can only expect more turmoil and less continuity.As Lou Costello once said: “Who’s on 1st ?”

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