Disinformation and Fake News Giving Propaganda A Good Name

Disinformation and Fake News Giving Propaganda A Good Name On March 2, 2017 the Brookings Institute ran an article “Disinformation campaigns target tech-enabled citizen journalists” (see: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/03/02/disinformation-campaigns-target-tech-enabled-citizen-journalists/?utm_campaign=Brookings%20Brief&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=send by e-mail&utm_content=43768809which is also the photo source).The article starts out talking in this area how today’s technology is ubiquitous and plentiful. Consequently nearly anyone with a smartphone can become a crusading reporter and expose wrongdoing. This can be especially problematic in countries where governments want to control their citizen’s perception of events. The article talks in this area a “troll factory’ where disinformation artists are paid to alter the perceptions of citizens by pumping “Out fake information in hard work to obfuscate Russian war crimes in Ukraine and Syria and retaliate hostile to Western investigators.Several disinformation techniques are noted and touched upon.All of this points to the need for more emphasis on countering disinformation hard work. Given the nature of disinformation and the sheer digit of participants, perhaps the approach should be a very unPSYOP one – that is use technical measures. If the Internet of Things (IoT) could be harnessed by criminals to launch Denial of Service attacks (see: https://arstechnica.com/security/2016/10/double-dip-internet-of-things-botnet-attack-felt-across-the-internet/for example), why couldn’t the same technique be employed as a disinformation jammer?I’ll leave that one to your imagination and your comments.

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Subtitles and PSYOP

Subtitles and PSYOPI am an avid reader of the Economist for a digit of reasons. First of all, as a British publication they can get away with adage things American Pubs simply cannot. Secondly they are generally, not always, but generally – sweet excellent journalists. My addiction to the Economist was jump started in Bosnia when I got my issue a couple of weeks late. I used those past issues as sort of the “instructor’s edition” because it was the only way I could figure out what happened while I was there.The April 25, 2015 edition of the Economist had an article free: “Literacy in India – A bolly excellent read”. (See http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21649537-india-tries-cheap-and-cheerful-way-teaching-people-read-bolly-excellent-read, which is also the photo source.)The essence of the article is that same language subtitles are employed as a tool to help people learn their own written language. Television has often been touted as a excellent way to learn a language.Watch a movie you’re familiar with and you can really match your English brain with the language being spoken by the characters on the screen. The article quotes the research firm Nielsen whose work shows that by exposing children to 30 minutes of subtitled films/songs the percentage of exposed children that become excellent readers doubles from 25 to 50%.What does this have to do with PSYOP?In the Internet age many of us have watched broadcasts in a language not our own and we have relied on voice over translations. What would take house if these foreign language broadcasts – even English ones to other audiences – used subtitles?What  is the potential to subvert the subtitles from an accurate or literal translation to one that favors your position or the actions you would like the consultation to take?Could this type of PSYOP be executed on smart phones as well?I’ll leave it to you!

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Counter Cyber PSYOP – Military Mission?

Counter Cyber PSYOP – Military Mission?  An ancient Internet maxim is “no one knows you’re a dog on the Internet”. As it turns out in many cases, no one knows who you are at all – and that may be that is a excellent thing. The New York Times of 25 Mar 15 ran an article “Behind a Veil of Anonymity, Online Vigilantes movement Islamic State” (see: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/25/world/middleeast/behind-a-veil-of-anonymity-online-vigilantes-battle-the-islamic-state.html, which is also the photo source).The essence of the article is that there is a assemble of anonymous ‘hackers’ who make the rounds Social Media in search of Daesh proponents and supporters. These individuals purportedly take the cyber battle to these accounts, particularly on Twitter and Facebook. The article also emphasizes that a significant digit of this cyber vigilantes are women.This is a global battlefield and for the moment let’s make the assumption that the targets of these hackers are not in the US. Assuming this to be the case, one could argue that the mission of countering Daesh propaganda is a military one and should be undertaken by MISO personnel.By way of precedent – I reckon it’s sweet safe to presume that the Chinese info warriors are heavily engaged on behalf of their government in such venues. Given the labor-intensive nature of social media, this would seem to give the Chinese, never at a loss for personnel, a significant advantage. Perhaps it is time for us to take a page out of their playbook for a change.In addition, the high proportion of civilians and non-state actors engaged in social media on behalf of our enemies mitigates for significant resources, military and civilian to counter the shape threat.Continuing with the argument does this mean that there needs to be a partnership between civilian and MISO social media counter Daesh personnel?I’d argue that this is not the case. The leaderless counter-Daesh force should continue in is anonymity while the real question before the community is should MISO (heavily reserve based perhaps) be ‘deployed’ (really working from home station) as a counter force to Daesh Social Media propaganda?I’ll leave that answer to you.

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Are We Ready to Outsource Influence Operations Once And For All?

Are We Ready to Outsource Influence Operations Once And For All? Daesh’s ability to exploit Twitter as a propaganda and recruiting resource has been very prominent in the media. One article, “Three Steps to Ruin ISIS on Twitter” (See: http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/03/three-steps-ruin-isis-twitter/107910/?oref=d-river) takes the view that there is a logical way to thwart these hard work. They suggest:1.    Take a networked approach to identifying pro-ISISaccounts for suspension.2.    Outsource counter-messaging to a party that can really be effective.3.    Twitter should become more like Facebook and YouTube.The second bullet caught my eye be cause of many discussions found in the media in this area MISO and Public Skill. This particular article doesn’t mention DoD, but they do believe: “The fundamental problem lies in the fact that the State Department, by virtue of being an official arm of the United States government, is limited in the way it can communicate with groups like the Islamic State on open platforms like Twitter”The track confirmation of the government as a global influencer, especially in areas of the world where the US has historically been unpopular, is not excellent. Both Department of State and Department of Defense have been at the shape game for some time and both have been subject to criticism in Congress and somewhere else.Yet the problem ruins. Clearly it is in the best interest of the US government to get the best bang for the buck with its shape dollar. And reasonable people would shape that shape is a keep gathering of government, yet no workable different has been proposed.If Cabinet level departments are ineffectual and contractors are too profit driven – what’s the right answer?I’ll leave it to you.Photo Source: https://twitter.com/thinkagain_dos

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